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Protecting the Institutional Investor-
Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?
Jerry W. Markhamt
In the latter half of this century, the institutional investor has
increasingly become a central player in financial markets. Institutions,
such as large commercial firms and pension funds, are often believed to
be experienced and "sophisticated" investors. Consequently, institutional
investors are generally subject to less regulation with respect to trading
activities than are most individual investors.
Many institutions trading in highly complex derivative instruments
have recently suffered staggering losses, calling into question the
appropriateness of the deregulation. Some institutions claim that they were
not able to assess the risk of derivatives and that the banks and other firms
who sold them the instruments should be liable for the institutions' losses.
Professor Markham argues that institutional investors should not be
able to take legal action against their brokers, claiming to be
unsophisticated investors, while at the same time enjoying the benefits of
deregulation solely because of an apparent sophistication. Specifically,
Professor Markham proposes a risk disclosure document requirement that
would assure that institutions are aware of the risks involved in derivative
trading and would inform dealers of the level of sophistication of the
institution with which they are dealing. This requirement would preserve
the efficiencies of deregulating institutional traders, while encouraging
greater institutional care that would result in less litigation and fewer
losses.
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Introduction
One of the most striking developments in financial markets during the
latter half of this century has been the growing dominance of the
institutional investor. The expanding role of large, institutional investors
has been accompanied by demands for lessened regulation of these
entities, because institutions are said to have the sophistication to protect
themselves from fraud and overreaching.' Regulators have been receptive
to such demands. Consequently, many institutional traders have been freed
of the regulatory shackles imposed in markets where the proverbial
widows and orphans invest. The result amounts to a virtual two-track
regulatory system: one set of rules governs trading by sophisticated
institutions, and another more restrictive set of rules governs trading by
unsophisticated "retail" customers.
1. For the purposes of this article, the term "institutional investor" encompasses large
commercial firms and wealthy and sophisticated individuals that have the ability, or the
wherewithal to retain outside advisers, to analyze the risks that may be encountered in
dealing with complex investments. As discussed below, the federal securities laws attempt
to set objective criteria for identifying institutions and individuals that have such wealth and
sophistication. Those criteria include minimum asset, income, and other tests. The
regulations of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission take a similar, although
somewhat more restrictive, approach. See infra part I.C.
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Recent events have called into question the appropriateness of this
two-track system. Many institutions trading in highly complex over-the-
counter derivative instruments have suffered staggering losses. Some of
these institutions now claim that they did not have the ability to appreciate
the risks of derivative instruments. They further assert that banks or other
firms who sold them these sophisticated and often novel instruments did
not take into account the institutions' lack of suitability,2
This Article examines the regulatory and legal issues raised by such
claims. It proposes some limited measures to better assure that institutions
trading in derivative instruments have the requisite expertise to understand
the risks involved. These proposals seek to assure that, once an institution
accepts the regulatory benefits of institutional status, the derivative dealers
with whom it transacts will be protected from after-the-fact claims that
the institution lacked knowledge and sophistication.
Part I of the Article traces the growth of the institutional investor and
the development of a two-track regulatory system for institutional and
retail investors. Part II examines the phenomenon of claims by
"unsophisticated" institutions who assert that they were sold unsuitable
investments or that they were not otherwise protected from substantial
losses. Part III of the Article then proposes some solutions to the dilemma
of the unsophisticated institution. Specifically, the Article proposes a risk
disclosure document requirement. This requirement would preserve the
efficiencies of a two-track regulatory system, while assuring that end users
of derivatives are aware of the risks they are facing and that dealers are
on notice as to the level of sophistication of the institution with which they
are dealing.
I. The Rise of the Institutional Investor
A. A New Force Emerges.: Evidence
The mix of participants in financial markets has changed dramatically
in the latter half of the twentieth century. One of the "most profound
developments" in the markets has been the shift in stock ownership from
individuals to institutions.3 In the 1950s, individual investors held ninety
percent of American equities. Now, just forty years later, institutions
control more than half of all stock.4
2. See G. Bruce Knecht, The Lawyer's Turn: Derivatives Are Going Through Crucial
Test: A Wave of Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al.
3. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH. & THE WHARTON SCH., THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
STOCK OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 1 (1993).
4. Id.
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This "institutionalization" of the financial markets has steadily
increased over the decades.5 In 1958, institutions held twenty-six percent
of outstanding stock.6 That figure grew to almost forty percent by 1970. 7
Block sales accounted for about fifteen percent of trading volume on the
New York Stock Exchange in 1970.8 By 1986, their share of trading
volume had grown to fifty percent. 9 In 1990, institutions held thirty-nine
percent of all over-the-counter stocks and eighty-seven percent of privately
placed securities. "
Naturally, the drop in individual ownership was equally dramatic.
Between 1980 and 1990, individual investors' share of all outstanding
stock dropped by one fourth." Direct stock ownership by individuals
dropped from approximately eighty-four percent of outstanding holdings
in 1965 to about fifty-three percent in 1991.2 By 1989, individuals were
net sellers of stock at the rate of about 3.5 million shares per day.
1 3
The shift in ownership patterns is reflected by the growth of financial
colossuses. In 1994, pension funds held securities valued in excess of $2
trillion, 4 insurance company holdings exceeded $1 trillion, and mutual
5. DIVISION OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 6 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000.] The
growth of the institutional investor has given rise to concern about the development of a
three-tiered market composed of (1) large institutions, (2) medium-sized institutions and
wealthy individuals, and (3) small retail customers. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 7 (1990) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS].
6. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, pt. 1, at 9 (1971) [hereinafter
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY].
7. Id. Between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of New York Stock Exchange stock held
by institutions increased from 17.2% to 35.4%. Institutions accounted for over seventy
percent of New York Stock Exchange volume by 1980. Joel Seligman, The Future of the
National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 114 (1984).
8. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 11-16 (1988)
[hereinafter MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT]. Block trades are transactions involving 10,000
or more shares or which are valued at $200,000 or more. Seligman, supra note 7, at 138.
9. MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT, supra note 8. In 1965, block trades accounted for
only 3.1% of volume. Seligman, supra note 7.
10. ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 5, at 6 n.8.
11. William Power, Small Investor Continues to Give up Control of Stock, WALL ST.
J., May 11, 1992, at CI.
12. Id.
13. ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 5, at 28. Total trading volume in 1989
was about 160 million shares a day. Id. at 8. Between 1955 and 1961 mutual fund holdings
increased from some $1 billion to more than $20 billion. JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET 277 (1982)
14. The pension funds alone hold investments that constitute about one quarter of the
stock and bond markets. Jim Saxton, A Raid on America's Pension Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 1994, at A12.
Vol. 12:345, 1995
Protecting the Institutional Investor
fund securities holdings were valued at over $800 billion.' 5 Mutual
funds' holdings increased even more dramatically in the early 1990s as
interest rates dropped sharply.' 6 Their assets expanded to over $1.8
trillion by August of 1993. This helped push the Dow Jones Industrial
Average to previously undreamed-of levels. 7
Surveys of the futures exchanges also indicate significant change in
the nature of those markets. The futures markets were largely devoted to
agricultural commodities before the 1980s. At that time, the so-called
"financial" futures began to intrude into these markets. Financial futures
now account for about eighty-three percent of the trading volume on the
Chicago Board of Trade, up from some forty percent in 1983, and ninety-
15. ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 5, at 6.
16. The modem day mutual fund is the direct descendant of the investment trusts that
grew rapidly in number during the 1920s. In 1921, there were just forty such investment
trusts. That number swelled to over 700 by 1929. At that time, investment trusts held over
$7 billion in assets, paying enormous fees to their organizers. See TOWNSEND HOOPES &
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, DRIVEN PATRIOT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES FORRESTAL 98
(1992). The investment trust funds suffered severe losses when the stock market crashed in
1929. The most highly publicized losses were in the Goldman, Sachs Trading Corporation.
After the crash, its stock traded at less than $2, down from over $100 in December 1928.
S. REP. NO. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1934) ("A veritable epidemic of investment
trusts afflicted the Nation."). The investment trusts were the subject of a number of abuses
in the 1920s, including fraudulent and misleading profit claims, excessive sales charges,
payments of capital to investors in order to improve returns and attract new investors,
investments in worthless securities and in the shares of other trusts in order to boost their
prices, and the outright conversion of customer funds. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT (1978).
The investment trust in the United States was modeled after English and Scottish
finance trusts that were organized as early as 1865. Id. at 334. Forerunners of the modern
mutual fund have also been traced to the Socidt6 Gnrale de Belgique, founded in 1822.
Max Rottersman & Jason Zweig, An Early History of Mutual Funds, FRIENDS OF FIN. HIST.,
Spring 1994, at 12.
For wealthy individuals, trust funds were another form of institutional trading. These
trusts were often managed by banks or trust companies. In 1929, more than a thousand
millionaires were using trusts. By 1975, bank trust departments were managing over $400
billion in assets. Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 209 (1992).
17. Finance, Up and Up Until It Popped, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1993, at 73. The
higher rates of return available in the securities markets from post-war growth attracted the
mutual funds. That growth also attracted investors who wanted the expert investment skills
and diversification that were available from mutual funds. This increased the demand for
stock as the mutual funds expanded and further increased prices. See INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 6, at 222. Individual investors still play important roles
through their indirect stock ownership interests in mutual funds, pension funds and insurance
company portfolios. The number of individual shareholder accounts and their absolute
volume continue to increase, even as their share of the market declines. MARKET 2000,
supra note 5, at II-1, 11-2.
349
The Yale Journal on Regulation
seven percent of the trading volume on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange."8
This substantial product change in the futures markets reflects an
evolution in the makeup of the participants in the futures markets. A study
conducted in the 1930s found that many traders in the commodity futures
markets were unsophisticated individuals, including large numbers of
housewives and unemployed persons. 9 Forty years later, another survey
disclosed that most small non-professional futures traders generally were
well educated, were over forty-five years of age, and earned over ten
thousand dollars per year; they were mostly lawyers, doctors, dentists,
and business professionals.2" A 1978 survey of traders in financial
futures found that these markets were being dominated by professionals
and institutions.21 A 1984 survey of futures traders also showed that
individual non-commercial traders held less than one third of the
outstanding financial futures contracts.2 2 The basic trend toward
institutional concentration in both securities and derivatives markets has
been steady and dramatic.
B. A New Force Emerges: Causes
Many factors have contributed to the growth of institutional investing
in the securities and futures markets. The growth of private and
governmental pension funds has played a significant role. Another
contributing factor has been the demand for diversification and expertise
in trading as the markets have grown more complex. Those factors led
to the growth of mutual funds, as did the almost continual rise in stock
prices since World War 11.23 The increased complexity of the markets
18. Steven E. Levingston, Rift Grows Between Factions at CBOT, WALL ST. J., Sept.
26, 1994, at CI.
19. JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 26-27 (1987).
20. MARK J. POWERS, GETTING STARTED IN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 10-11
(4th ed. 1983).
21. See RONALD B. HOBSON, CFTC, FUTURES TRADING IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
(1978).
22. FEDERAL RESERVE BD. ET AL., A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF
TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS IV-7 (1984).
23. In 1971, the SEC conducted a massive study of institutional traders. The study
concluded, "The shift of institutions into stocks over the postwar period does not lend itself
to any complex econometric explanation. Rates of return on equity have been much above
bond rates throughout the period. The shift to stocks appears a belated and long process of
adaptation to these circumstances." INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 6, at 222.
This report also noted that "[ilnstitutions appear to have changed their expectations regarding
the future return on equity investment in response to the high return earned by a segment
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and the willingness of institutions to engage in more speculative activities
have also led to the development of hedge funds that seek to take
advantage of leveraged opportunities.4
Other legal factors have also spurred the rise of the institutional
investor. The "prudent man rule" for trustees has been modified to allow
increased participation in equity markets.' The Department of Labor's
decision to ease the restrictions on pension fund investments under ERISA
also allowed greater flexibility in investment decisions.26 These legal
changes freed institutions from investing in only a limited list of
investment devices, setting the stage for expansion in investment portfolios
by the growing number of pension funds, insurance companies, mutual
funds, and other institutions.
Theoretical developments also contributed: the advent of modern
portfolio theory led investors to seek increasingly diversified investment
portfolios." Under this theory, an investment portfolio is to be judged
by its overall performance.28 This has led to the increasing use of
"passive" institutional investment strategies that track market moves
through diversified portfolios.29 Modern portfolio theory also induced
experimentation in the world of leveraged investments, including futures
of the mutual fund industry." Id. at 223. Thus the higher rates of return available in the
securities markets from post-war growth initially attracted the mutual funds. As post-war
growth continued, it enhanced the value of mutual funds and increased demand for stock
as the funds expanded. The growth of the mutual funds further increased the demand for
stock and further elevated stock prices.
24. "The term 'hedge fund' generally refers to a private fund involving fewer than
100 investors that can engage in more aggressive forms of trading, such as margin buying,
short selling, day trading, and speculative use of derivatives." MARKET 2000, supra note
5, at 11-3.
25. Bevis Longstreth, Fiduciaries, Capital Markets and Regulation: The Current
Challenge, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 237 (1988). The prudent man rule limited trustees
to investments that only a "prudent" man would use for funds of the beneficiaries of a trust.
This standard was restrictive and did not permit trustees to engage in speculative or risky
investment strategies. See generally Joseph V. Rizzi, Trustee Investment Powers: Imprudent
Application of the Prudent Man Rule, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 520 (1975).
26. See generally James D. Hutchinson, The Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 VILL.
L. REV. 15 (1976-77); Longstreth, supra note 25, at 239-40.
27. Under modern portfolio theory, no adviser or stock picker can outperform the
market. The best an adviser can do is diversify portfolios to reflect overall market changes.
See generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT AND THE
PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986).
28. Id. ERISA regulations "reflect most dramatically the influence of portfolio theory
because they specifically state that the prudence of an investment decision should not be
judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action
plays within the entire portfolio." Longstreth, supra note 25, at 239-40.
29. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, at 11-3.
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and options .3' Futures markets have been particularly attractive because.
they offer broadly indexed contracts at relatively low transaction costs.
3
1
Institutions soon found indexed instruments to be to their liking, and now
dominate those markets. The increased participation of institutions in the
futures and options markets has spurred the development of even more
complex instruments to accommodate their needs and desires. The steadily
growing over-the-counter derivatives market is largely an institutional
market.32
The derivatives market may be described more accurately as a
"hybrid" instrument market. This is because many of these instruments
have elements of futures, options, and conventional securities. For
example, a hybrid bond may be offered at a discount from its maturity.
Coupled with the bond is a "kicker" that will pay an amount over the
maturity value if the price of a particular commodity or index of
commodities rises above a specific level. This allows the bond purchaser
to profit from those price changes and perhaps have a hedge against
inflation that would be unavailable in a conventional bond. The purchaser
will pay an implied premium by receiving a smaller discount on the bond
than would otherwise be available, thus allowing the issuer to reduce
financing costs. This makes the arrangement look very much like a bond
with an attached option on the specified commodity or index.33
Another derivative instrument is the swap, which comes in many
forms. In one variety, a party with a fixed-rate loan swaps its loan
payments with another institution that has a variable-rate obligation. This
effectively allows the first institution to convert its fixed-rate obligation
into a floating-rate obligation, thereby reducing its risk exposure to
decreases in interest rates. The second institution may anticipate an
30. Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modem
Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 90 (1990).
31. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, at 11-3. See generally MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT,
supra note 8; NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND
ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987)
32. For discussion of the growth and development of the over-the-counter derivatives
market, see David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal
Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986); Jerry W. Markham,
"Confederate Bonds, " "General Custer," and the Regulation of Derivative Financial
Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 101 (1994) [hereinafter Markham, "Confederate
Bonds']; Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity
Exchange Act:A Call ForAlternatives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. I [hereinafter Markham,
Regulation of Hybrid Instruments]. For discussion of the regulation of over-the-counter
derivative instruments, see Sheila C. Bair & Susan Milligan, United States: U.S. Financial
Regulation of OTC Derivatives, 1994 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REV. 1.
33. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, supra note 32.
352
Vol. 12:345, 1995
Protecting the Institutional Investor
increase in interest rates or have other needs that make it desirable to
transform its obligation from a variable to a fixed rate loan.34
The over-the-counter derivatives market is now composed of over
twelve hundred kinds of derivatives, including such exotica as "death-
backed bonds," "worthless warrants," "exploding options," "inverse
floaters," and "heaven and hell bonds.' ' " The notional amount of the
outstanding derivative instruments in that market is estimated to be
between $12 trillion36 and $35 trillion. 7
C. The Regulators Respond: Deregulation and a Two-Track System
The growing dominance of the institutional investor, and of markets
in derivatives tailored to its needs, soon led to demand for reduced
regulation. 3' The institutions wanted greater freedom in their investment
34. For a discussion of the swaps market, see Schuyler K. Henderson, An Analysis
of Interest Rate and Currency Swaps, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 497 (1986);
Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability
of the Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1989); Lauren S. Klett, Comment,
Oil-Price Swaps: Should These Innovative Financial Instruments Be Subject to Regulation
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission?,
93 DICK. L. REv. 367 (1989).
35. Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulator Signals Move on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Apr.
21, 1994, at A3; Antonia Sharpe & Laurie Morse, Survey of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1993, at XII; Elayne Sheridan, FCMs Capitalize on OTC Business, FUTURES INDUSTRY,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 26, 29. Innovation continues in the development of new derivative
instruments. See, e.g., Michael Santoli, Some Investment Banks Create Hybrids, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 7, 1994, at A9 (describing equity linked notes); Greg Steinmetz, A Derivative lied
to Snapple Shares Takes Sharp Drop, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1994, at A3 (discussing
"ELKS," which are bonds with return linked to both price of a common stock and an interest
rate); David Wighton, Bidder Opts for Derivative Contract, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, at
22 (describing difference from trading in stocks).
36. Steven Lipin, GAO Study Seeking Stricter Controls on Derivatives Draws Industry
Fire, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at B7.
37. Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise,
Industry Fights to Avert Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1994, at Al. The "notional
amount" of a derivatives contract refers to the value of the commodity or instrument
underlying the derivatives contract. This value may not reflect the actual risk exposure or
payments required under a derivatives contract, however, because delivery of the underlying
commodity rarely occurs. The parties usually make payments based on price or interest rate
changes that occur in the underlying commodity or obligation. Id.
38. The growth of the institutional investor has also given rise to a debate as to whether
institutional investors should be passive investors or active shareholders who can monitor
and make demands on corporate management. See generally Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1997 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L. J. 445
(1991).
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decisions, and they wanted to be free of restrictive regulations that had
been adopted to protect unsophisticated investors such as those who had
been so badly damaged by the Stock Market Crash of 1929. The
institutions particularly chafed at being shackled with the restrictive
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), nearly all
of which had been adopted to protect the small investor. Clearly, it was
argued, the institutions were too sophisticated to be regulated like the
typical retail customer of a broker-dealer.
1. SEC Responses
Regulators have responded favorably to requests for the removal of
restrictive regulations on institutions. The SEC has been particularly
supportive of the development of a two track regulatory system-one for
institutional investors and one for unsophisticated investors. For example,
it has allowed the development of the so-called private placement of
securities to institutional investors and wealthy individuals, without
requiring compliance with many of the cumbersome registration
requirements imposed on public offerings. The SEC's Regulation D
exempts issuers from many of the registration requirements of the federal
securities laws when they place their securities with "accredited"
investors. 39 Accredited investors are defined to include banks, savings
and loans, pension funds, and tax exempt organizations and trusts with
assets in excess of $5 million. Accredited investors may also include
natural persons whose net worth exceeds $1 million or who have had
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two preceding years.'
When accredited investors are the only participants in a securities issue,
the amount of disclosure required is greatly reduced. In fact, there are no
specific disclosures required.4" The private placement market has grown
rapidly and is a popular investment medium for institutions. In 1993
39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1993). The private placement exception may also
be used to exempt institutional transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988). The SEC also
exempts distributions of certain foreign securities from underwriting restrictions when the
securities are being sold to institutional investors. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6(i) (1993).
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1993). For a discussion of the operation of Regulation
D and related exemptions, see THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 4.17 (Student Ed. 1990).
41. See HAZEN, supra note 40, at § 4.17. SEC Rule 505, for example, allows offerings
of up to 5 million dollars during any twelve month period to any number of accredited
investors and up to thirty-five non-accredited investors, provided that there are no general
solicitations or advertising. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1993). Rule 506 is similar to Rule 505,
but it allows for offerings of unlimited size, provided that the purchasers are all accredited
investors or that the non-accredited investors or their advisers are sufficiently sophisticated
to understand the terms of the offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1993).
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alone, almost $220 billion in debt and equity was raised through private
placements.42
The SEC's efforts have resulted in the development of an institutional
market in the securities industry in which the participants are viewed as
having the resources and sophistication to protect themselves when
assessing the risks of their investments. Many institutions have the
bargaining power to demand instruments tailored to their particular needs
and to receive customized investment opportunities. A public shareholder
has no such power and often lacks the ability to assess the risks of the
investment without the analysis and advice of a broker-dealer or
investment adviser.
2. CFTC Responses
Institutions are accorded special treatment in the futures markets.
Commercial traders engaged in "hedging" operations are not subject to
the "speculative limits" imposed by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) on speculators. Speculative limits restrict the ability
of individuals to engage in large scale transactions in heavily leveraged
futures instruments.43 The CFTC has also relieved commodity pool
operators and commodity trading advisers from certain disclosure
requirements when their customers qualify as large institutions.'
Institutional investors in commodity futures have benefited in other
ways from CFTC and Congressional actions. The Commodity Exchange
Act contains a provision that requires all futures contracts to be traded on
42. NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 18-19 (1994). A factor contributing to the development of institutional hedge funds
is the exclusion in the Investment Company Act of 1940 for investment companies with less
than one hundred security holders. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1988). Such hedge funds are
essentially mutual funds with less than one hundred participants.
43. Traders are exempt from speculative limits where they are engaged in "bona fide"
hedging transactions as defined in CFTC regulations. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (granting
CFTC powers to curb excessive speculation); 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1994) (defining bona fide
hedging transactions). See generally CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 921 (1978) (validating CFTC's speculative trading limit on soybean futures
contracts).
Speculative traders had long plagued the futures markets and raised concerns with
respect to price manipulations. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices-The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991); Wendy C. Perdue,
Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 4.7 (1994). These exemptions apply, for example, to persons with
a portfolio of $1 million or more, banks, insurance companies, certain employee benefit
plans with assets of five million dollars or more, and individuals with a net worth of $1
million or more. Id.
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an exchange that is licensed by the CFTC as a "contract market."45 The
CFTC also requires most commodity options contracts to be traded on
contract markets.46 This could have precluded the trading of many over-
the-counter derivatives because they often contain elements of futures and
options. After struggling for some time with the issue of what derivatives
would constitute futures or options, however, the CFTC adopted a set of
rules and interpretations that allowed for a wide range of over-the-counter
derivatives to be traded by institutions, including swaps. 7
Nevertheless, uncertainty remained over the CFTC's ability to exempt
institutions or other investors from the exchange trading requirement. In
the absence of an exemption, the institutions' customized derivative
products could not have been traded even on an exchange because they
did not fit the standardized format then required for exchange trading.4"
The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992"9 was enacted to provide
specific authorization to the CFTC to exempt institutions from the
exchange trading requirement to the extent that they engage in swaps and
certain other over-the-counter obligations." The CFTC later adopted
regulations that identified the institutions and instruments that would be
exempt from the exchange trading requirement."' Among the entities
exempted were banks, trust companies, savings associations, credit unions,
governmental.entities, and insurance companies.
5 2
The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets grew rapidly as a
result of the CFTC's determination to exempt OTC derivative instruments
45. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988). See generally Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange
Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977 (1991).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 33.2 (1994). Options contracts between institutions for "commercial"
purposes were exempted from this requirement. 17 C.F.R. § 32.12 (1994).
47. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Derivative Instruments Under the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 1, 27-28.
48. The popularity of the over-the-counter derivatives market is due in part to the fact
that transactions can be customized for institutional investors. By contrast, futures and
options traded on contract markets are standardized in their terms.
49. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1993).
50. Institutions sought to assure that CFTC regulations were not applied to those
transactions. See generally Mark D. Young & William L. Stein, Swap Transactions Under
the Commodity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76 GEO. L. REv. 1917
(1988).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1994). See also John Lindholm, Financial Innovation and
Derivatives Regulation-Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 73.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1994).
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from the exchange trading requirement.5 3 The swaps market alone is
estimated to have a notional value in excess of four trillion dollars.5 4
Institutions engaging in interbank currency and certain other financial
transactions are also exempted from the requirements of the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) by the so-called Treasury Amendment added to the
CEA in 1974.' s The foreign exchange market is one of the world's
largest financial markets. s6 Institutions trading currency in that market
are freed from many of the restrictive regulations imposed in markets
where small, unsophisticated customers are allowed to trade. 7
3. The Assumptions Underlying Deregulation
Several assumptions underlie regulators' decisions to exempt
institutions from regulatory requirements. One basic assumption is that
regulation, in terms of its sheer cost in any particular transaction as well
as its more general effects on market competition and efficiency, is
expensive and therefore needs to be fully justified. The SEC requirements
53. The CFTC is now rethinking this exemption and may narrow its application, while
adopting an antifraud rule for exempted transactions. See Jeffrey Taylor & Mark H.
Anderson, CFTC to Reconsider Exemption It Gave to Off-Exchange Derivatives Dealers,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1994, at C19.
54. William T. Maitland & Jerry W. Markham, CFTC Rules to Provide Legal
Certainty for OTC Products, FUTURES INDUSTRY MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 20, 22.
Institutions sought legal certainty to assure that CFTC regulations were not applied to those
transactions. See generally Young & Stein, supra note 50.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Treasury Amendment provides that nothing in the
Commodity Exchange Act:
shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign
currency, security warrants, security rights, re-sales of installment loan contracts,
re-purchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase
commitments, unless such transactions involve the sales thereof for future
delivery conducted on a board of trade.
Uncertainty concerning the scope of this amendment has led to much litigation and confusion.
The CFTC's position is that the amendment applies only to institutions or highly
sophisticated and wealthy individuals. See Markham, "Confederate Bonds," supra note 32,
at 123-24. See generally CFTC v. Standard Forex, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,063 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
56. Daily trading volume in the interbank currency market is estimated to exceed one
trillion dollars per day. Foreign Exchange Unsettling, ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 88.
57. Wealthy individuals may be treated like institutions when they trade in the
interbank currency market. See, e.g., Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 977 (4th
Cir. 1994). Compare CFTC v. American Board of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding Treasury Amendment exception inapplicable and granting injunction to stop sale
of options contracts involving foreign currency) with CFTC v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd.,
[1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,222 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(denying CFTC injunction to stop sale of foreign currency contracts).
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that mandate filings of a prospectus and detailed disclosures are expensive
to comply with and result in delays in awaiting review by the SEC staff.
These expenses and delays should be eliminated if the investor does not
need the protection that the disclosure regime is intended to provide.
The SEC assumes that commercial institutions and wealthy and
sophisticated investors can determine for themselves what information is
needed before making an investment decision. Institutions probably have
the bargaining power to demand the information they need from issuers
or underwriters. The same is not true of small retail customers. These
small investors arguably need the protection of the SEC's prospectus
requirements, which guarantee thorough disclosure.
Another perceived difference between institutions and retail customers
is that institutions are already better protected by diversification. If a
particular investment fails, the overall damage to the diversified investor
should not be fatal. Most retail customers do not have sufficient assets to
diversify their holdings in such a manner, except through their investments
in such institutions as mutual funds.
The exemptions available for institutions under the CFTC's regulatory
structure are no less justified than those adopted in the securities industry.
Unless exempted, derivative instruments with futures elements must be
traded on an exchange designated as a contract market.5 The
assumptions made in exempting institutions trading derivatives are that
such transactions are desirable, that the derivatives market cannot function
efficiently in an exchange trading environment, and that large institutions
do not need the policing that is available on a regulated exchange.
II. The Problem of Unsophisticated Institutional Investors
A. The Rising Specter of Financial Losses and Damage Suits
1. Recent Evidence of Institutional Losses
The ascendance of the institutional investor was spurred by the
deregulation of institutional trading activities. Events were to demonstrate,
however, that institutions do not always have the ability to protect
themselves from speculative investment losses. Like other investors,
institutions will make and lose money. Their size and expertise do not
guarantee that their investments will always be profitable. Indeed,
institutional investors have established, quite conclusively, that they can
58. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
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seem as naive in their investments in derivative instruments as a proverbial
widow or orphan.59
59. The savings and loan crisis has already shown beyond peradventure that institutions
do not always have the wherewithal and sophistication to analyze and assess investment risks.
Although some of the failed thrifts were small operations, many others were of a sufficient
scale such that one would have presumed them capable of analyzing and dealing with
investment risk in every form. Yet their deregulation resulted in a debacle in which hundreds
of billions of dollars of government funds have been expended in order to rescue depositors
from the naivety, foolishness, and even criminality of officers and directors of these
institutions. See generally S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. REP. No.
54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Administration's Plan to Resolve the Savings and Loan
Crisis: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BOWDEN, CHARLES KEATING AND
THE MISSING BILLIONS (1992); Lissa Broome, Private Market Solutions to the Savings and
Loan Crisis: Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Savings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 111 (1991); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey From
"Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation": The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990); Robert A. Wittie & Rebecca H.
Laird, The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989: An
Overview, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 83 (1991).
The repo crises of the 1980s involved institutional investors and raised considerable
doubts as to their sophistication. A repurchase agreement ("repo") is simply an agreement
to sell securities with a commitment to repurchase them at a specified future date. A reverse
repurchase agreement is an agreement to buy and later resell the same securities. SEC, THE
USE OF REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS BY BROKER-DEALERS (1987). Repos generally involve
United States government securities and are used for short term financing purposes. At one
point, they were "the most important financing vehicle for the broker-dealer industry." Id.
at 2-3. The dollar amount of repo transactions grew from $14.8 billion in 1977 to almost
$200 billion in 1986. Id. at 3. In the seven years prior to 1985, however, there were failures
of government bond dealers that resulted in losses of nearly $1 billion. Most of those losses
were the result of repo transactions in which the securities were not returned or where other
abuses occurred. SEC, REGULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET: REPORT
BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE 8 (1985).
Failed merger transactions and soured junk bond deals in the securities industry, to
mention two notable problem areas, involved institutions that neither understood nor
appreciated the risks of those transactions. See generally GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS
OF DEBT (1992); CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL: THE JUNK-BOND RAIDERS AND
THE MAN WHO STALKED THEM (1988); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS
AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990); JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT,
THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN (1992); RICHARD PHALON, THE
TAKEOVER BARONS OF WALL STREET: INSIDE THE BILLION-DOLLAR MERGER GAME (1981);
RoY C. SMITH, THE MONEY WARS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT BUYOUT BOOM
OF THE 1980s (1990); DAN G. STONE, APRIL FOOLS, AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE RISE
AND COLLAPSE OF DREXEL BURNHAM (1990).
A study of pension funds by two anthropologists also raises some serious questions as
to the true sophistication of those institutions. Among other things, the authors concluded
that pension fund managers seemed to be preoccupied in their decision making with avoiding
blame when things go wrong and with managing personal relationships, rather than with
critical investment analysis. WILLIAM M. O'BARR &JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE & FOLLY,
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To cite the most extreme example, the government of Orange County,
California had to declare bankruptcy after losing more than one billion
dollars through investments in derivative instruments.' Orange County's
brokers are now facing claims that they should not have recommended
these transactions, even though the County's actual investment decisions
were handled by its own treasurer. 6 The Orange County treasurer was
an accomplished and experienced manager who had previously garnered
large returns for the County through equally complex transactions.62
Orange County enjoyed the gains from its prior trading, but now
claims victim status after being forced to confront certain fundamental
facts that every investor, whether small or large, should know: markets
go up and down; no one can consistently beat the market; reward is a
function of risk-the greater the potential return, the greater the risk of
loss. 63 Not all of the facts are public, but it appears that the County
THE WEALTH & POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 228 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Bitter Fruit, Orange County, Mired in Investment Mess, Files for
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Al; Frederick Rose & Andy Pasztor, Orange
County Expects to Maintain Public Services, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A3; Michael
Siconolfi & Anita Raghavan, Wall Street Races to Sell Collateral, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1994, at A13;
61. American Municipalities, Merrill Lynched, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1994, at 76;
Dominic Bencivenga, Municipal Bankruptcy, Orange County Case Tests Reach of Chapter
9, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1994, at 5 (class action suits filed against Orange County's broker);
G. Bruce Knecht, Merrill Lynch's Role as Broker to Fund May Expose it to Liability,
Lawyers Say, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A13; Sarah Lubman & John Emshwiller,
Before the Fall, Hubris and Ambition in Orange County: Robert Citron's Story, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 18, 1995, at Al; Andy Pasztor & Lynn K. Adler, Orange County Budget Shortfall
is Put at $172 Million over Next Six Months, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at A4; Andy
Pasztor & Laura Jereski, Orange County Sues Merrillfor $3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13,
1995, at A3; Jeffrey Taylor, Behind the Throne, Hard-Charging Broker Draws the Spotlight
in Orange County Mess, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
62. See The Culprits of Orange County, FORTUNE, Mar. 30, 1995, at 58.
63. See generally Karen Damato, Muni-Bond Investors, Shaken by Debacle in Orange
County Calif., Raise Questions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at Cl; Sallie Hofmeister,
Many Questions, But Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at Cl; Sallie Hofmeister, Fund
Head Resigns in California, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at Cl; Laura Jereski & Thomas
T. Vogel, Jr., Orange County Borrowed $1 Billion Even As Its Investment Losses Piled Up,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3; G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Lead to Huge Loss in
Public Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, atA3; Floyd Norris, In Orange County, Strategies
Sour, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at Cl; Andy Pasztor, Orange County Reduces Loss
Estimate to $1.69 Billion From $2.02 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A4; Frederick
Rose, Orange County Needs to Sell Assets of $5.45 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994,
at A4; Rhonda L. Rundle & David J. Jefferson, Orange County Officer Quits After Fund
He Managed Lost $1.5 Billion of Value, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1994, at Al; Jeffrey Taylor,
SEC Probed Orange County Investments Just Months Before the Fund's Collapse, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 1994, at A2; Leslie Wayne, California County Facing a Huge Loss in Sour
Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al. Nevertheless, municipal bond issuers still
find derivatives useful. Thomas D. Lauricella & Candace Cumberbatch, Big Municipal Bond
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wants to have its cake and eat it too: it wants the benefits from its good
investments, but not the losses from its unlucky ones.'
Mutual funds have shown that they too can lack sophistication. Some
funds have suffered huge losses from derivatives trading.65 A Piper
Jaffray mutual fund alone lost some $700 million due to these instruments,
and Paine Webber was forced to put millions of dollars into its funds to
offset derivatives losses." Money market funds that were previously
thought to be immune to impairment of capital also suffered losses from
derivatives. To avoid that issue, some, but not all, of the funds' managers
made good on losses suffered from derivatives.67 As a result of these
sizable losses, the category "derivatives" has taken on a negative
connotation in some circles.68
The Orange County debacle has generated much publicity, but Orange
County is not the only institution to suffer significant losses from
derivatives. Metallgesellschaft A.G., to cite a dramatic example, lost
$1.37 billion from oil-related derivative transactions undertaken by its
United States subsidiary.69 The parent company closed these positions
in a near panic in order to avoid even larger losses. Ironically, it is now
claimed that the transactions were erroneously closed because the company
Issuers Turn to Derivatives in an Effort to Bring Down Borrowing Costs, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 1994, at C21.
64. According to a newspaper report, Merrill Lynch officials had debated internally
about whether to restrict Orange County's trading because of its high risk profile. They were
concerned, however, that Merrill Lynch might be viewed as an adviser to the County and
hence face liability if they tried to direct or guide the County's trading. See Laura Jereski,
In-House Battle: Merrill Lynch Officials Fought Over Curbing Orange County Fund, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
65. See, e.g., Sara Calian, BankAmerica's Cost to Rescue 2 Funds Soars, WALL ST.
J., July 1, 1994, at A2; Kitchen-Sink Bonds: Paine Webber's $180 Million Misstep, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1994, at Cl.
66. G. Bruce Knecht, Piper Manager's Losses May Total $700 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 25, 1994, at Cl; Running out of Steam, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1994, at 93.
67. See, e.g., Sara Calian & Georgette Jasen, Manager's Prop Up Money Market Funds
With Quiet Bailouts in Face of Losses, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1994, at CI; Georgette Jasen
& Jeffrey Taylor, Derivatives Force First Closure of Money Fund, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
1994, at CI; Leslie Wayne, Investors Face First Money Market Fund Loss, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1994, at C 1; see also John Greenwald, The Devil's in the Derivatives, TIME, Oct.
10, 1994, at 54 (money market fund shuts down as the result of losses from derivatives).
68. See generally Sarah Calian, To Lure Investors Funds Launch Attack on 'D" Word,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1994, at CI. But see Saul Hansell, Derivatives as the Fall Guy:
Excuses, Excuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, § 3, at 1.
69. Jeffrey Taylor & Allanna Sullivan, German Firm Finds Hedges Can Be Thorny,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at Cl. The firm's share price dropped to thirty percent of its
value before the loss. Business and Finance, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at 7. See generally
Frances A. McMorris, Metallgesellschaft Is Said to Be Target of Extortion Plot by Former
Employee, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at BI0.
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did not understand how they worked and that the losses could have been
avoided if the contracts had been left to accomplish their purposes.70
Other institutions that have experienced notable losses include the
Kashima Oil company in Japan, which lost some $1.5 billion in currency
transactions; Japan Airlines, which lost some $450 million from currency
"hedges" ;7 1 Procter & Gamble, which lost over $150 million from
derivatives; and Kidder Peabody, which lost over $350 million from what
appeared to be fraudulent derivative transactions by one of its own
traders. 72  Hedge funds also have suffered disastrous losses from
derivatives,73 as have pension funds, college funds, and municipal
authorities.74 More recently, Barings PLC, a large, old, British banking
institution, lost over $1 billion and was forced into receivership due to
poorly supervised trading in derivatives by a twenty-seven year old trader
70. A Risky Old World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at 18; Gunning for Metall,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at 96; Metallgesellschaft: A Waste of Resources?, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 24, 1994, at 85; Metallgesellschaft, Answering Back, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1994, at
104; Sylvia Nasar, The Oil-Futures Bloodbath: Is the Bank the Culprit?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 1994, at F5.
71. Business and Finance, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 5. Chinese traders also lost
heavily in currency transactions. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Currency Futures Take Hefty Toll
on Chinese Traders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1994, at A6.
72. See Markham, "Confederate Bonds," supra note 32, at 132-33; Michael Siconolfi,
Bond Epic, How Kidder, a Tiger in April, Found Itself the Prey by December, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 29, 1994, at Al. For other examples of institutional losses from investments in
derivative instruments, see Susan Antilla, Salomon's Hong Kong Hangover, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1994, at F13 (Hong Kong investors suffer large losses in derivatives); Stuart
Elliott, $100 Million Loss Is Seen by Salomon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at Cl;
Greenwald, supra note 67 (Glaxo Holdings loses $115 million from derivatives); Steven
Lipin, Risk Management Has Become Crucial in a Year When Strategies Proved Wrong,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at CI (J.P. Morgan loses more than $200 million in mortgage
backed securities); Sara Webb, Lehman Sues Chinese Firms Over Big Loans, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 1994, at CI (Lehman sues over defaults on foreign exchange and swaps totaling
over $100 million).
73. See Laura Jereski, The Wrong Stuff, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1994, at Al; Steven
Lipin et al., Portfolio Poker: Just What Firms Do With 'Derivatives'Is Suddenly a Hot Issue,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1994, at Al (Granite Hedge Fund loses $600 million from derivative
transactions). See generally Conner Middelmann, Hedge Funds: Down but not Out, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at IX.
74. See Markham, "Confederate Bonds," supra note 32, at 132-33. See also
Greenwald, supra note 67 (Shoshone Indian Tribe loses $1.5 million from derivatives; Maple
Grove, Minnesota loses $1.4 million); G. Bruce Knecht, I Owe U., WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
1994, at Al (small Texas college loses more than $10 million from derivatives trading); G.
Bruce Knecht, The Aftermath: Hit by Derivatives, Florida County Tries to Decide What to
Do, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at Al (Florida County loses some $25 million on
derivatives); Knecht, supra note 2 (Charles County, Maryland loses $5 to $7 million trading
derivatives and City College of Chicago loses some $45 million). Several banking institutions
have also apparently suffered serious losses. See Saul Hansell, For Banks, Time of
Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at Cl.
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in one of its foreign offices." Chemical Bank lost some $70 million from
unauthorized currency transactions by one of its employees, 76 and one
of the largest credit unions in America was seized by federal regulators
after it suffered large losses in derivatives. 7
2. Playing Victim: The Institutions Sue
Some of the institutions suffering losses from derivatives are now
claiming that they were victimized by the banks or other derivative dealers
who sold them the instruments.78 Many lawyers seem to seek victim
status for their clients, particularly where the client's crimes or follies are
so great as to allow no other defense. Victimization claims by institutions
that assert that they are too unsophisticated to assess investment risks raise
that effort to new levels.79 Nevertheless, the academic community
apparently gives credence to these claims."0
This concern is not an entirely novel one. Institutions have tried in
the past to shift onto others the blame, and the loss, that resulted from
their trading activities. Those earlier efforts, however, did not involve
75. Nicholas Bray & Lawrence Ingrassia, Losses at Barings Grow to $1.24 Billion:
Authorities Begin Sale of 'Good' Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at A3; A Royal Mess:
Britain's Barings PLC Bets on Derivatives-And the Cost Is Dear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
1995, at Al.
76. Timothy L. O'Brien, Chemical Bank Incurs Big Loss in Peso Trading, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 4, 1995, at A3.
77. G. Bruce Knecht, Regulators Seize Credit Union Organization, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2, 1995, at A3; G. Bruce Knecht, Derivatives Holdings of Credit Unions Scrutinized, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at CI (derivative trading causes the biggest credit union failure in
history); G. Bruce Knecht, Bad Bet: The Derivatives Mess Touches Employees at the White
House, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at Al; see also Randall Smith & John Connor, Matter
of Security: Risky Derivatives Are Huge Source of Funds for Federal Agencies, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 20, 1995, at Al (derivatives issued by government financing unit cause large losses
to Army welfare and recreation fund).
78. Knecht, supra note 2.
79. As one commentator has stated, "It is hard to escape the conclusion that big
companies like this should not be playing games they don't understand." Floyd Norris,
Market Watch, Procter's Tale: Gambling in Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 3,
at 1. See also Harold Ticktin, Derivatives: The Parker Bros. Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1994, at F9 (arguing investment officers at institutions trading in derivatives should be tested
to assure they know how to play Monopoly).
80. Susan Antilla, Wall St. Ethics Meeting Isn't Open to the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1995, at C2 (Columbia University law professor argues that even sophisticated customers
may need to be told not to engage in particular transactions); Saul Hansell, Challenged Bank
Defends its Derivatives Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at C5 (University of Texas law
professor states that before derivative instruments, a corporation was "automatically assumed
to be sophisticated," but now there is "not such a binary world" and a "spectrum of
sophistication").
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claims to widow and orphan status. Rather, they generally asserted that
the institution's own employees were acting in an unauthorized manner
in conducting the trading that caused the loss. The institutions asserted that
the broker accepting the orders, rather than the institution itself, should
bear the loss caused by the trading of the institution's unauthorized
employee.
In the futures industry, for example, there have been several major
suits charging that broker-dealers did not protect their institutional
customers from the speculative activities of the institutions' own
employees."' Strangely, the CFTC and some courts have seemed quite
willing to accept such claims. In Baird v. Hales,82 for example, the
CFTC stated that a broker could be liable for the speculations of a third
party controlling a customer's hedge account. Similarly, in Evanston Bank
v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc. ," a district court stated, in denying
summary judgment, that a broker could be liable for speculative
transactions by a savings and loan. Federal regulations prohibited savings
and loans from engaging in such speculative transactions. In essence, the
court held that the broker would be liable if it failed to monitor the
employee of its institutional client.8 4
81. This is not a novel approach. The savings and loan debacle resulted in an
aggressive quest for a "responsible" culprit. In search of a deep pocket, the government and
private investors have sued the lawyers and accountants for the failed banks and thrifts.
These suits generally charge, in one form or another, that accountants and lawyers failed
to prevent the officers of these institutions from committing fraud. These claims seem to
be premised on an underlying belief that institutions must be protected from the follies of
their officers by professionals that service the organization and that an equal duty runs from
these professionals to the institution's customers. See generally FDIC v. O'Melveny &
Myers, 969 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994); In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992);
PRACTICING LAW INST., LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST THE FDIC AND THE RTC 1993;
Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients,
67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 559-74 (1994) (discussing efforts by the SEC and banking agencies
to hold lawyers responsible for the actions of their clients); Harris Weinstein, Attorney
Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53. Cf. Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (holding that private
plaintiff may not maintain aiding and abetting liability suit under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
82. [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,856 (C.F.T.C.
1985). Nevertheless, the CFTC applied estoppel to bar recovery. Id.
83. 623 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. II1. 1985).
84. See also Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 907, 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (sustaining fraud claim based on allegation that broker had told client that
stock index futures were "safe"), rev'd, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,007 (2d Cir. 1987); Frye v. Northpoint Agricultural Resources, Inc., [1990-
1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,076 (C.F.T.C. 1992); In re
Interstate Sec. Corp., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,295,
at 38 (C.F.T.C. 1992) (broker liable where employee of a financial institution traded on the
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Perhaps the most extreme case of all is Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.
v. CFTC. 5 There, a corporation claimed that it had been defrauded by
its broker through the entry of unauthorized transactions into its account.
The trades had been entered by an employee of the company who was a
convicted felon and a compulsive gambler. The corporation claimed that
this individual was not authorized to enter the trades at issue and that
liability should, therefore, rest with the broker. The CFTC and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted this argument, holding Drexel liable
because it failed to determine whether the employee was authorized to
enter into the trades in question. This suggests that a corporation cannot
monitor its own officers and must, therefore, depend on the restrictive
protection normally imposed on broker-dealers that deal with the widows
and orphans of the world.6
One derivatives case that arose from the recent spate of losses
deserves particular attention even though it was subsequently settled. In
Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co.," Gibson Greetings, an
international firm that manufactures and sells greeting cards, alleged that
it had been misled and abused by its prime bank, Bankers Trust, through
the offer and sale of a "LIBOR-squared" transaction. The transaction
required that "Gibson would receive a fixed interest rate and pay a
floating interest rate based on a calculation requiring the squaring of the
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for six month time deposits of
U.S. dollars."" Gibson had previously engaged in swaps, but premised
institution's account in an unauthorized manner); Plywood Wholesalers, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., C.F.T.C. Slip Op. (July 26, 1982) (broker liable for
hedging recommendations to a commercial hedger); State v. Morgan Stanley, 416 S.E.2d
55 (W. Va. 1992) (broker liable for state agency's trading where agency alleged to have
exceeded its authority); Michael Siconolfi, Brokerage Firms Pay Big Damages in 'Dramshop'
Cases, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at Cl (large damage award entered against firm for
not preventing a wealthy investor from committing "financial suicide").
85. 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The author was counsel to Drexel Burnham
Lambert on the appeal in this case.
86. But see Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc. v. Clark, 901 F.2d 1568 (1lth Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1027 (1991). In this security options case, the Eleventh Circuit held
that an experienced customer could not escape liability for nonpayment of margin by
claiming that a broker violated exchange rules by overextending credit to the customer. The
court held that when an experienced customer expressly requests his broker to ignore a
contractual provision, in this case the margin account provision for payment of margins, the
customer will be deemed to have waived that requirement.
87. Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., Civ. No. 1-94-620 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
12, 1994) [hereinafter Gibson Greetings]. See generally Bankers Mistrust, ECONOMIST, Nov.
19, 1994, at 87; Exiled on Wall Street: Bankers Trust: A Bum Rap for Derivatives?,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 49.
88. Gibson Greetings, supra note 87. Gibson Greetings also entered into a Treasury-
linked swap and a "knock-out" call option. In the Matter of BT Securities Corp., Securities
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its victim status on the assertion that it otherwise had no expertise with
derivatives, that it advised Bankers Trust that it did not want to speculate,
that it was relying on Bankers Trust for advice, and that "Gibson
justifiably believed that it had entered into a special relationship of trust
and confidence with Bankers Trust." 9
Gibson Greetings aroused a great deal of controversy and incited
regulators to bring disciplinary actions against Bankers Trust. 90 The case
was settled after regulators discovered that Bankers Trust had misled
Gibson Greetings on the valuation of its losses and market position.9,
Act Release No. 7124 (Dec. 22, 1994).
89. Complaint at 6, Gibson Greetings, supra note 87. Procter & Gamble has filed a
similar suit against Bankers Trust. See Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Says P&G Deal Wasn't
Unique, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at Cl; Floyd Norris, Procter's Tale: Gambling in
Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 3, at 1. Procter & Gamble lost some $157 million
as the result of "a swap in which its payments were tied to both the yield on five-year U.S.
Treasury notes and the price of thirty-year U.S. Treasury bonds." Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers
Trust Faces Inquiry on Derivative Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at Cl. Among other
things, Procter & Gamble's complaint alleged that this swap had huge concealed risks and
that Bankers Trust had repeatedly represented that it had "superior expertise" with these
swaps. Complaint at 5, 7, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust, Civ. No. C-1-94-735
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 1994). See generally Bankers Trust's Dirty Linen, ECONOMIST, Feb.
11, 1995, at 68; G. Bruce Knecht, P&G Amends Its Bankers Trust Suit to Get More Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at D9; P&GAmends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A3. Cf Rita Koselka, Safe When Used Properly, FORBES, Aug. 15,
1994, at 47 ("We can understand P&G's embarrassment, but we can't buy the alibi that this
$30 billion globe-spanning outfit was a naive victim.").
90. In the Matter of BT Securities Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7124 (Dec. 22,
1994); In the Matter of BT Securities Corp., CFTC Doc. No. 95-3 (Dec. 22, 1994).
91. Bankers Trust initially reassigned some of its staff after an internal probe of the
derivative claims made against it. See Samuel Hansell, Executives Suspended by Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at D1; Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Reassigns Executives in Midst
of Internal Sales-Practice Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at A3. Thereafter, it settled
the case with Gibson Greetings, reducing Gibson Greetings' remaining liability from some
$20 million to $6.2 million. John Connor and G. Bruce Knecht, Bankers Trust Facing Action
on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A3; Steven Lipin, Gibson Greetings Reaches
Accord in Suit Against Bankers Trust over Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1994, at A3.
Bankers Trust also later settled charges brought by the CFTC and the SEC and entered into
a settlement with banking authorities. Bankers Trust Settles Charges on Derivatives, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 23, 1994, at Cl; Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust and U.S. Set Pact on Disclosure
of Derivatives' Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at Al; Jerry Knight, Derivatives Dealer
Fined $10 Million: Agency Cites 'Fraud' by Bankers Trust Unit, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,
1994, at Al; Carol J. Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995,
at 50, 54, 58-60; Richard Waters, U.S. Bank Agrees to Derivatives Controls, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1994, at 1.
The suit by Procter & Gamble continues, and other claims are being filed against
Bankers Trust. Brett D. Fromson, Bankers Trust, Gibson Settle Derivatives Suit, WASH.
POST, Nov. 24, 1994, at DI; Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Woes Spread to Money Unit,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A3. Bankers Trust also faces other problems from its
derivative activities. Saul Hansell, Big Bank's Derivative Problems, Larger Scope Cited by
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However, the larger issue of whether Bankers Trust owed a duty to
protect Gibson Greetings from inappropriate investments was left
unresolved. One regulator asserted that there was no effort being made
to establish a requirement that derivative dealers ensure that their
transactions are suitable for their institutional customers.92 The Federal
Reserve Board did, however, require that Bankers Trust provide its
customers with sufficient information to allow the customers to understand
the terms and risks of the derivative instruments being sold. 93
The assertions and the publicity that resulted from this episode raise
interesting concerns about the role of the Gibson Greetings officials who
authorized these transactions. The unusual nature of these investment
positions must have raised some questions as to the manner of their
operation and the risks they posed. A responsible financial officer should
have examined these unusual transactions to assess the risks they posed,
as well as their utility.
Another relevant issue is the failure of Gibson Greetings' board of
directors in its oversight responsibilities.' The board should have
assured that management was monitoring the trading of such exotic and
complex instruments. If the claims made in Gibson Greetings' complaint
are true, there is a question of how such an institution can also claim that
it is a sophisticated investor entitled to the benefits of an exempted class
under the federal securities laws or the Commodity Exchange Act, or that
it should be given other exemptive relief that is based on its presumed
sophisticated status as an institutional investor.
Instead of focusing on the derivatives dealers, 95 regulators could shift
their attention to those institutions claiming "victim" status. If institutions
Bankers Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at DI; G. Bruce Knecht, Bankers Trust 4th-
Period Net Fell 64% as Many Derivatives Pacts May Default, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1995,
at A3; 7711 Debts Do Us Part, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 69.
92. Tim W. Ferguson, Commodities Boss Forswears Future in Swaps, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 3, 1995, at 9.
93. Federal Reserve Bd. Press Release, Dec. 5, 1994, Re: Written Agreement by
Bankers Trust New York Corp. et al., Doc. No. 94-082-WA/RB-HC. The amount of
disclosure made by derivative dealers to their customers continues to be a matter of concern.
Saul Hansell, Derivatives Draw More Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1995, at C39.
94. Bankers Trust asserted that Gibson's management was informed of the risks of
these transactions. Saul Hansell, Challenged Bank Defends Its Derivatives Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at D4; Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Says Gibson Greetings Was Fully
Aware of Derivatives' Risk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1994, at A4.
95. Signed, Sealed, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1994, at 81; Jeff Bailey, SEC Charges
Broker With Civil Fraud in Sale of Derivatives to Municipalities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
1994, at A4. The SEC brought another enforcement action against a dealer that was selling
"toxic waste" derivatives (so-named because of the risks they pose) through fraudulent sales
practices. Id.
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were threatened with losing their privileges to invest in unregulated
markets, they might be less inclined to bring lawsuits against their brokers
whenever an investment went sour.96
B. The Shortcomings of Current Legal Remedies
An institution suffering losses from a complex financial transaction
may claim, as did Gibson Greetings, that its institutional sophistication
is limited in scope and that it is no more sophisticated than a widow or
orphan in the area of complex financial instruments. The argument has
some appeal." A manufacturer of greeting cards or other consumer or
industrial products may not have a treasurer's office or chief financial
officer that follows all of the complexities of the new instruments that are
constantly being developed on Wall Street. Yet it seems reasonable to ask
the institution's financial officers to analyze a project for risk and reward
before committing corporate funds.
The consideration of claims made by the "unsophisticated" institution
brings three legal concepts into play: suitability, reliance, and fiduciary
duties. Each must be analyzed to reach a viable solution for the
institutional "widow" or "orphan."
1. Suitability Requirements
The suitability concept was developed under the federal securities
laws and until recently has generally been limited to the securities
industry.98 Simply stated, this concept precludes a securities broker from
recommending a securities transaction that is not suitable for the customer
receiving the recommendation because of that customer's particular
96. The SEC does plan to expand disclosure requirements with respect to firms that
use derivatives. Lee Berton, SEC Plans to Expand Disclosure Rules Covering Derivatives
Used to Hedge Risk, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1995, at A2. The agencies will also predictably
seek to push over-the-counter trading onto the exchanges, where more control and greater
protection are available. See Alfred Steinherr, Taming the Wild Beast of Derivatives, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at 18 (advocating movement away from less regulated OTC markets
toward organized exchanges); cf David Dishneau, CBOTLeader Gets a Scolding, RALEIGH
NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 19, 1994, at Dl (CFTC rejects exchange effort to compete with
over-the-counter derivatives by exempting pension plans and other institutions from CFTC
regulations).
97. See generally Saul Hansell, Challenged Bank Defends Its Derivatives Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at D4.
98. At least one court has applied this concept to insurance products. Anderson v.
Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (misrepresentations
made concerning the suitability of an insurance program).
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investment needs and objectives. This is a subjective test that requires an
analysis of each customer's financial circumstances and goals. 9
The genesis of this concept is the New York Stock Exchange "know-
your-customer" rule."0 The rule requires brokers to obtain information
about the financial circumstances of customers before recommending a
trade. '' The rule's original purpose was to protect brokers from their
customers. Brokers were required to gather this information to assure that
their customers had the ability to meet their financial obligations in
securities operations.
The suitability concept evolved into a protection for the customer
from broker recommendations unsuited to the customer's needs."° This
is a very paternalistic approach to customer protection. Arguably, it is also
a very sound approach where an unsophisticated customer is relying on
the financial expertise of a broker.0 3 The requirement does not seem
to make much sense where a sophisticated customer is involved. Such a
customer can presumably look out for itself.
The CFTC has rejected the suitability approach taken by the securities
industry, even where unsophisticated investors are involved. "4 The
CFTC believes that its disclosure requirements offer sufficient protection
to customers who must be warned that they themselves should consider
whether they are suitable for futures trading.0 5
In the futures industry, customers trading futures contracts must be
given a one-page statement setting forth some of the more obvious risks
99. NICHOLAS WOLFSON ET AL., REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES
MARKETS 2.08 (1977).
100. Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2,405 (1982).
101. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), amended,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978), aff'd on cross-appeal, rev'd and remanded on principal appeal, 637 F.2d 77
(2d Cir. 1980).
102. See, e.g., NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 2.
103. See, e.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir.
1978) (broker failed to inform customer of the unsuitability of her investments); Yancoski
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 92 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (broker told customer that only
safe investments were being made). See generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES
REGULATION: FRAUD MANIPULATION AND OTHER CLAIMS § 10.02 (1987).
104. The CFTC's determination to reject a suitability standard has a long and
convoluted history. See MARKHAM, supra note 103, §§ 10.03-.07.
105. Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,345 (C.F.T.C. 1986); Martin v. Shearson Lehman/American
Express, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,354 (C.F.T.C.
1986). Cf. Ho v. Dohmen-Ramirez, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,391 (C.F.T.C. 1986), aff'd, [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 24,101 (9th Cir. 1988) (broker liable for trading customer's account in utter
disregard of the manner expected by the customer).
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 12:345, 1995
involved in trading these contracts."ta The CFTC draws no distinction
between institutional investors and individual customers in rejecting the
suitability approach. 7 Even though these markets are extremely
complicated and highly risky, individual and institutional investors must
themselves assess the risks of trading, rather than rely on the assessments
of their brokers."°8
The courts also seem reluctant to expand the suitability concept even
to allow damage claims on the part of unsophisticated investors who
receive unsuitable recommendations." Yet at least one banking
regulator has sought to impose a suitability standard on banks marketing
over-the-counter derivative instruments." 0 That, however, may have
been a panicked response to the explosive growth in sales of those
instruments and the large losses that some investors experienced with them. "'
106. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1994). See generally MARKHAM, supra note 103, § 10.07
(1987).
107. Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,345 (C.F.T.C. 1986) (no liability for suitability unless customer
is exceptionally stupid or gullible and broker knows of that disability and seeks to take
advantage of it).
108. The courts have generally accepted the CFTC's approach. See, e.g., Puckett v.
Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,205 (5th Cir. 1992); Dyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 928
F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1991); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28 (1st
Cir. 1986). Administrative law judges at the CFTC, however, do seem inclined to find
misrepresentations when unsophisticated traders are induced to participate in the futures
markets. See MARKHAM, supra note 103, § 10.07 (1987).
109. See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413,
1419 (11th Cir. 1983). Cf Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410
F.2d 135, 142-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (private right of action
allowed for breach of "know your customer" rule where the conduct was tantamount to
fraud). See generally Note, The Suitability Rule: Should a Private Right of Action Exist?,
55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493 (1981).
110. Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S. Guidelines on 'Derivatives' Obliging Banks to Mull
Customer Needs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at A24; Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Questions and Answers for Banking Circular 277, OCC Bulletin 94-31 (May 10,
1994).
111. Unfortunately, additional losses in derivatives have led bank regulators to further
embrace suitability standards. Keith Bradsher, Three Federal Agencies Act to Curb Certain
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, §1, at 41 (suitability requirements for structured
notes); Saul Hansell, Mellon Takes $130 Million Loss on Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1994, at D4 (bank reimburses customers $130 million for losses on structured notes);
Matt Murray & Gary Putka, Mellon Bank Plans a Charge of $130 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 1994, at A2. But see Regulating Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at 13
("it is not the task of central bank regulators to protect large industrial companies from their
bankers").
NASD has also sought public comment on an interpretation that would apply its
suitability rule to institutional customers in some instances. The interpretation is somewhat
ambiguous. Apparently, it would apply the suitability requirement where a broker-dealer
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Imposing a suitability requirement on firms dealing with institutional
investors seems unnecessary." 2 The institution can look out for its own
interests. Further, in conducting transactions with a derivatives dealer, the
institution is dealing at arm's length with an equal. Consider how
inappropriate it would be to claim that a manufacturer must protect its
institutional suppliers from improvident bargains. How does the
institutional investor's claim differ, unless there has been fraud or
deception?
2. Reliance Claims
In Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc. ,"' the Tenth Circuit held that information
contained in a private placement memorandum would be imputed to a
sophisticated businessman even though he had failed to read the document.
The court held that the businessman's reliance on oral misrepresentations
that conflicted with the memorandum was not justified." 4 This seemed
to signal that the sophistication of customers could negate their claims of
reliance on oral statements of their brokers or advisers. Thus, in Kennedy
v. Josephthal, " 5 the First Circuit took note of, among other things, the
sophistication of plaintiffs in finding no justifiable reliance on oral
misrepresentations. 116
The courts have refused to go so far as to impose an affirmative duty
of inquiry on the part of investors, and unsophisticated investors may be
given more protection than the businessman in Zobrist.'17 In Wegerer
v. First Commodity Corp.,"' the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim that
investors were given adequate warnings of risk from statements in risk
has reason to believe that an institutional customer is relying on a broker-dealer's
recommendation and is not making an independent analysis of the broker-dealer's advice.
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers Notice 94-62 (Aug. 1994).
112. See Unsuitable: Itls Wrong to Protect Companies and Professional Investors from
Their Own Actions, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 18.
113. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
114. See also Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988);
Platsis v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
115. 814 F.2d 798, 804-5 (1st Cir. 1987).
116. See also Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1418-
19 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (Customer could not recover damages because he knew or could have
ascertained the risks of his investment with the exercise of reasonable diligence. The
customer was an experienced businessman).
117. For discussion of assertions that investors should act with due diligence before
making claims under SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5, see THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.12 (2d ed. 1990); Note, The Due Diligence
Requirement for Plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L. J. 753.
118. 744 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984).
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disclosure documents. The court in that case found that the customers
were not sophisticated investors, were lied to repeatedly, and were
badgered into investing by numerous telephone calls. The investors were
also told not to read the risk disclosure materials because they were
purportedly given to customers merely to comply with legal requirements.
The court distinguished Zobrist.9 because the customers were not
sophisticated. 120
In Indosuez Carr Futures, Inc. v. CFTC,'2' the Seventh Circuit
considered the assertion that fraud claims under the Commodity Exchange
Act contain a "reasonable reliance" requirement comparable to that found
in common law fraud claims. Such a standard would impose a duty on the
customer to investigate broker statements. The court concluded that fraud
claims under the Commodity Exchange Act and the federal securities laws
do not contain such a requirement. It apparently believed, correctly, that
customers have a right to rely on the representations of their brokers. The
court also noted, however, that reliance may bar recovery where
customers close their eyes to a known risk, where written materials given
to the customers contradict oral misrepresentations, or where the
customer's knowledge is equal to that of the broker.
122
The CFTC seems to take a harsher view of reliance claims, and it
employs the related concept of causation to dismiss fraud claims for which
it has no sympathy. For example, in Steen v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., the CFTC
held that a customer seeking damages for violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act must show that the alleged violative conduct proximately
caused the customer's losses. 123 Here, the customer was a sophisticated
and savvy trader, and she knew that the market could not be predicted,
119. 744 F.2d at 723.
120. Nevertheless, other cases have suggested that an investor may not shift blame to
her broker or avoid an obligation where the investor had the opportunity but failed to inform
herself about a matter affecting the investment. Cf Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
683 F.2d 603, 607 (1st Cir. 1982) (customer bound by terms of arbitration agreement in
commodity futures contract even though he had not read it); McNally v. Gildersleeve, [1992-
1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,006 (8th Cir. 1994) (justifiable
reliance required for fraud claim).
121. [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,125 (7th Cir.
1994).
122. But see Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530
(7th Cir. 1985) (lackadaisical investigation of loan by pension fund trustees did not relieve
defendant of liability for inducing loan); cf Indemnified Capital Investments, S.A. v. R.J.
O'Brien & Assocs., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,916 (7th
Cir. 1993) (common law fraud claim rejected where customers could have obtained trading
performance evaluations that would have belied defendants' claims of success).
123. [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,245, at 38,723-24
(C.F.T.C. 1992).
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notwithstanding the claims made by her broker. In a concurring opinion,
the CFTC's former chairman would have imposed a requirement that
customers use due diligence in protecting themselves against fraudulent
conduct. 124
Interrelated with the reliance issue is the nature of the customer's
investing experience. Does the customer's sophistication and investment
experience translate from the securities or other fields to commodity
futures trading? In Cohen v. Manganiello,'" the investor was an
engineer who held advanced degrees, had previously purchased
commodity pool units, and had some securities experience. The CFTC
held that these factors were relevant in assessing reliance but were
insufficient to overcome the specific misrepresentations at issue. 2 6 The
CFTC distinguished a district court decision in Peterson v. Lincolnwood,
where lack of reliance was found on the part of the plaintiff, who was a
stockbroker, a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), and a person with eighteen years of experience in the stock
market who admitted that he was familiar with the practices of the
commodities market. 
127
124. Id. at 38,726. In Rutten v. Meyer, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 25,376 (C.F.T.C. 1992), the CFTC refused to defer to an administrative law
judge's assessment of the complainant's proof of reliance and causation. The complainant
asserted that he was unfamiliar with the complexity of futures trading, but the record
disclosed that he had previously traded and had been given a risk disclosure document.
Further, the customer failed to protest numerous losses in his account that were in excess
of the loss limitation claims allegedly made by the broker. See also Heublein v. International
Trading Group, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,591
(C.F.T.C. 1992) (customer should have realized that broker's claims were false after
sustaining losses that belied those assertions); Wolken v. Refco, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,779 (C.F.T.C. 1987) (no reliance shown where
the customer was a sophisticated investor); Walton v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., [1992-
1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,136 (C.F.T.C. 1985) (complainant
without actual knowledge of fraud may still be estopped from recovery where ignorance is
result of willful disregard of facts or gross negligence).
125. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,346 (C.F.T.C.
1986).
126. In Weinberger v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,845 (C.F.T.C. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1334 (6th Cir.
1987), however, the CFTC rejected claims that a customer's experience in trading securities
should have precluded him from relying on the misrepresentations of a broker. The CFTC
stated that "sophistication and experience are not the only factors to be considered in
resolving reliance issues." See also Cohen v. Manganiello, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,346 (C.F.T.C. 1986) (sophistication of investor did not
negate reliance on specific misrepresentations).
127. [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,576 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also Puckett v. Rufenacht Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,520 (S.D. Miss. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1990) (investor's experience relevant to reliance).
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In a later case, In re JCC, Inc., the CFTC stated that an
administrative law judge erred in limiting cross-examination on the
securities and other investment experience of customers in determining
whether they had been defrauded by misrepresentations. 28 The
administrative law judge had allowed examination on the customers'
futures related experience but not on their securities experience. The
CFTC stated that such a bright line test ignored similarities that exist
between futures and securities investments. Nevertheless, in DeRance, Inc.
v. Paine Webber, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that a district court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding specific details about a customer's
non-futures investments.' 29 The customer was claiming a lack of
sophistication. The brokerage firm wanted to show that the customer was
a speculator who had lost millions of dollars trading penny stocks, silver
mines, deep-sea treasure hunts, and Mexican mutual funds. The court
found that these investments were not directly probative of whether fraud
had been committed by the defendants.
These cases, for the most part, fail to focus on some fundamental
concerns. Congress and regulators have made a determination that
institutional investors are a special class. They do not need the broad
regulatory safety net that is spread wide for small investors, and
institutions should not be required to incur the costs and inefficiencies of
that regulatory net. Logically, the tradeoff for such an exemption is that
the institution will incur a responsibility to read disclosure documents and
investigate investment opportunities to determine the risks of its
transactions. Claims of reliance on isolated oral statements of salespersons
are not in keeping with the expected role of a sophisticated institution.
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duty concept has also been adapted to provide
protection for the unsophisticated in financial transactions, particularly
where they are dependent on the expertise of their broker or another
professional. In brief, this concept requires a person in a position of trust
and confidence to use special care in carrying out his or her duties under
that relationship. 1
30
128. [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,080 (C.F.T.C.
1994).
129. [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,450 (7th Cir.
1989).
130. For a discussion of the development of the fiduciary concept and its application
in the financial services industries see Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199 (1992).
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The difficulty with fiduciary duties is that the exact standard of care
is never spelled out, and the scope of duties will vary according to the
particular nature of the relationship. For example, a broker that simply
executes an order for a customer will have only a narrow range of
fiduciary duties, while a broker with complete discretionary control over
a customer's account will be subject to the broadest range of fiduciary
responsibilities. Thus, there is a sliding scale of duties that increase as the
broker exercises greater control over the customer's trading.' 3
The fiduciary duty concept has met heavy criticism in recent years
because is seeks to impose non-contractual duties on contractual
relationships, though the parties did not bargain for such duties.'32
Critics argue that contractual negotiations and market discipline are more
efficient regulators than the courts or government agencies who seek to
invent fiduciary duties to govern the parties' liabilities when a dispute or
overreaching occurs. 3 Fiduciary duties seem particularly inappropriate
where two institutions are dealing with each other in an arms-length
relationship. '"I
The critics of fiduciary duties seem to be making some impact on the
courts. For example, in Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit certified to the Mississippi Supreme Court questions to
determine what, if any, fiduciary duties commodities brokers owe to their
customers. 35 The Mississippi Supreme Court responded that a customer
seeking speculative profits was not owed a duty by the broker to prevent
the customer from committing financial suicide. The court stated that the
fiduciary duties of a broker end with the duty to carry out a customer's
instructions. "6
131. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
951 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
132. The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a broad fiduciary standard for liability
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Nevertheless, fiduciary duties may play a role in determining whether individuals are liable
for insider trading when they "misappropriate" corporate information. See generally
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
133. See generally Robert C. Clark, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 76, (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1984); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. L. REV. 1 (1985).
134. See Markham, supra note 130.
135. Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014, 1021 (5th Cir.
1990). The questions certified by the Fifth Circuit are set forth at Puckett v. Rufenacht,
Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 919 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1990).
136. Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
25,144 (Miss. 1991).
The Seventh Circuit has also become a center for jurists who seek to curtail the
application of fiduciary duties to financial transactions and investments. See, e.g., Jordan
375
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In fact, institutional investors should not be treated as widows and
orphans who must be protected from derivative instruments by fiduciary
duties. Unlike unsophisticated investors who need the protection of
fiduciary duties, institutions have the capability to make their own
investment analysis. Alternatively, they can retain an independent adviser
to assess the recommendations they receive from the purveyors of complex
financial instruments.
Sober reflection should result in the rejection of the paternalistic
approach of the fiduciary duty concept as applied to institutions. Any firm
should be able to assume that an institution has the "independent"
capability to assess the risk of its investments if that institution has the
status of an accredited investor under the federal securities laws or is an
exempt institution under the Commodity Exchange Act. Such an institution
should also be able to assess its own investment objectives, needs, and
abilities. "'
C. Deregulation, Responsibility, and Risk
The deregulation of institutional trading is a progressive measure
designed to enhance market efficiency and to reduce the regulatory costs
and burdens imposed on institutions. That relief, however, should carry
with it the responsibilities that are the premise for its grant. Institutions
can and should make their own risk assessments. Institutions should not
be able to claim the benefits of deregulation unless they are also prepared
to assume its costs.
Admittedly, an institution may need protection in certain instances.
Anti-fraud prohibitions are necessary even for the most sophisticated
institution. In some cases, institutions may not have the ability to assess
the risks of a particular instrument or trading program. For example, a
manufacturing firm that has a predictable cash flow and little need for
v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988).
137. There is a definite need to clarify the obligations of derivative end users so that
they may understand the risks they are incurring. A recent survey indicates that many
institutions believe derivative dealers should protect them from risks, or at least share
responsibility, and that dealers should ensure that the institution's own employees are
authorized to trade. See Suzanne McGee, Derivatives Risk Should Be Shared, Users Survey
Says, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1995, at C15.
The category of institutions that may be sold derivative instruments continues to
expand. Martha Brannigan, First Union, Undeterred by Headlines, Peddles Derivatives to
Midsize Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1994, at CI. Nevertheless, at least some institutional
investors have been able to resist the urge to invest in derivatives when they did not believe
derivatives were appropriate for their portfolio. Local Heroes, Public Finance Chiefs Are
Often Very Boring; That's the Good News, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at Al.
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investment activity may not have a sophisticated internal financial
management team. In such circumstances, the institution will presumably
rely on a broker, dealer, bank, or another firm acting as such to apprise
the institution of investment risks. The institution may even have to
depend on a broker, dealer, or bank for advice on the suitability of a
particular instrument for the institution, which would require the adviser
to assess the institution's particular investment objectives and needs. Such
a "dependent" institution would deserve protection from fraud and
overreaching, and it might even need the added protection of fiduciary
duties.
The existence of "dependent" and "independent" institutions in this
sense raises delicate issues as to the appropriate duties of a broker-dealer
or other vendor of institutional financial products. For example, with an
"independent" institution, it may be practically sufficient for the broker-
dealer to provide the institution with a private placement memorandum
or summary documentation. In that case, should all of the information in
that document be imputed to the institution? This seems to be the thrust
of the Zobrist holding, but where does that leave the dependent institution
that relies on a derivatives dealer for investment advice on the dependent
institution's particular circumstances? Finally, should the same standards
apply to both the independent and the dependent institutions?
In the absence of a suitability requirement or a contracted advisory
role, the basis for an institution's protection would hinge on the
application of fiduciary duties and reliance doctrines. The use of those
concepts, however, raises a number of difficult questions. What is the
scope of such duties? Under what circumstances do they arise? How do
courts applying reliance doctrines determine whether an institution was
acting in a dependent rather than an independent capacity? How can
broker-dealers protect themselves from claims by institutions who are
merely disappointed in the results of their investments? The next section
offers a proposal to mitigate these problems, which are difficult and
persistent because regulators actually confront a spectrum, from adviser-
dependent to adviser-independent, of institutional investors.
III. Tackling the Problem of the Unsophisticated Institution
A. Risk Disclosure Statements
One effective and fairly simple way to identify the dependent
institution and to limit claims by sophisticated institutions who are merely
seeking to blame others for their investment losses is to borrow a page
from the CFTC's book. The CFTC requires futures brokers to provide
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a customer with a one page risk disclosure statement before opening the
customer's account. The required risk disclosure statement sets forth
specific risks that may be encountered in futures trading and advises
customers to assess their own suitability for such trading. 3 ' The SEC
has taken a similar approach for novice traders in penny stocks. 39
1. Proposed Form
Institutions dealing in exempt derivative instruments and claiming
institutional investor status should be required to sign a one-page
document describing the obvious risks of trading derivatives or other
instruments. A new regulation would be needed to put this requirement
into effect. The CFTC, SEC, and banking regulators together would
appear to have the authority to implement such a requirement.
Nevertheless, legislation may be needed to close any potential gaps in the
agencies' authority. Such an effort seems necessary and appropriate in
light of the continuing stream of derivative losses.
The regulation or statute requiring this disclosure statement would
specifically allocate responsibility. The disclosure document would inform
the institution that it could not rely on the broker-dealer, bank, or other
vendor of the instrument for a suitability determination or a risk
assessment beyond the terms set forth in any offering circular. 40
138. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1994).
139. The SEC penny-stock rules require that prospective penny stock customers be
given a standard form disclosure document before engaging in their first transaction. The
prescribed disclosure includes a warning that prospective customers should not make a
hurried decision and that high pressure sales techniques can be a warning sign of fraud. The
disclosure document states that it is illegal for salespersons to promise that a stock will
increase in value or is risk free or to guarantee against loss. The document further states
that investors should be wary of companies with no operating history, that investors may
lose part or all of their investment, that large dealer spreads will prevent an immediate resale
of the stock at the same price, and that the stock may fall quickly in value. The disclosure
document also describes the broker-dealer's duties to customers, the rights and remedies
available to the customers under the federal securities laws, a description of the dealer
market for penny stocks, and other matters. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-2 and Schedule 15G
(1994).
140. A new doctrine emerging under the federal securities laws may have some
application here. Courts have held that company profit predictions and other forward looking
information predicting future results is material information to investors. Nevertheless,
liability will not attach for erroneous predictions if the predictions are accompanied by
language that "bespeaks caution" as to their reliability. See, e.g., Saltzberg v. TM
Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11 th Cir. 1995); In re Donald Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850,
856-57 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part, 35 F.3d 1407, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1994); Luce v.
Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986); Moorehead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F. 2d 243 (8th
Cir. 1991); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991); Sinay v.
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Instead, the institution and vendor would be operating in an
acknowledged, arm's-length relationship. The institution would be
required to draw on its own resources for risk and suitability
assessments. 1
41
Alternatively, the institution could simply refuse to sign the disclosure
document. By doing so, the institution would lose its accredited investor
status under the federal securities laws. The CFTC's exemption from the
Commodity Exchange Act exchange trading requirement for derivatives
would also be lost, and the Treasury Amendment's exemption for foreign
currency transactions would be made unavailable to such an institution.
Collectively, the loss of these exemptions should deny the institution
access to the over-the-counter derivatives market. 42  Instead, the
institution would be limited to the same markets and be given the same
level of protection as any other unsophisticated investor. 143
The proposed risk disclosure statement should be kept simple and
short. The statement should recite that the institutional investor
understands that investment risks can vary, that some financial instruments
have leverage features that can result in losses in excess of the total
investment, that some instruments may be illiquid, and that many
derivative and other instruments should not be invested in without an
analysis of their risk functions and suitability.
The institutional investor would further acknowledge in this statement
that it is a sophisticated investor and is responsible for conducting its own
analysis of the suitability of the instruments in which it invests. The
acknowledgment should state that the institutional investor is responsible
for its own investment decisions and for monitoring its own employees
Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991).
A risk disclosure document for institutional investors will bespeak caution about
derivatives and make it harder for institutions to claim that they were not given material
information about these investments.
141. See, e.g., Jeffrey Taylor & Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Faces Inquiry on
Derivatives Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at Cl.
142. There is some uncertainty whether the SEC and CFTC have jurisdiction for some
over-the-counter derivatives. Nevertheless, they have been fashioning theories for asserting
their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Settles U.S. Charges on Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 23, 1994, at C1; Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust and U.S. Set Pact on Disclosure of
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at Al. In any event, legislation could be adopted
to remove any uncertainty.
143. If the institution signed the document, it could not thereafter claim, of course,
that it was not a sophisticated investor. See, e.g., Wright v. National Warranty Co., 953
F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff and wife accredited investors where they had
represented themselves as sophisticated investors, but later claimed that wife was not);
Anastasi v. American Petroleum, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Co. 1984) (private
offering exception was available where issuer had a reasonable belief as to eligibility of
buyer; buyer's actual financial condition was not determinative).
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in their trading of the institution's account. The disclosure document
should further state that, even where the institution contracts with a third
party for investment advice, the third party would bear only such
responsibilities as may arise from its agreement with the institution or as
recognized by law.'"
The initial risk disclosure statement should be approved by the
institution's board. This will assure that the board is on notice of its
responsibilities to oversee the institution's investment programs and the
trading of its own employees. 4  That duty could not be shifted
144. The risk disclosure statement could be in the following form:
The undersigned investor acknowledges that it is a sophisticated investor and that:
1. The investor is responsible for conducting its own analysis of the
risks and suitability of its investments, and the investor is
responsible for monitoring the trading of its account by third
persons or by its own employees to assure that all trading is
properly authorized;
2. The investor may contract in writing with a third party for
investment advice or for the trading of its own account. The
investor, however, will still remain liable for any losses from its
trading. The third party will be liable only for a breach of its
written contract, for fraud or other legal requirements;
3. The investor understands that investment risks can vary, that
some financial instruments have leverage features that can result in
losses that exceed the investor's investment, that some instruments
may be illiquid, and that many instruments, particularly derivative
instruments, should not be the subject of investment without an
analysis by the investor of their operation, functions and suitability;
4. The investor acknowledges that there are substantial risks even
where derivative instruments are being used to hedge or limit other
risks. These include basis risks and the risk that substantial funds
may be required for margin or other obligations on short notice.
145. Institutional losses from derivative instruments have given rise to
recommendations that internal controls and management oversight be strengthened. See
GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES I (1993); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES,
Circular No. 277 (Oct. 27, 1993). The risk disclosure statement will assure that management
is on notice of its obligation to assure adequate controls are in place and that the risks of
the instruments are being managed adequately by an outside adviser. See generally John
Gapper, Derivative Users "Lack Adequate Controls of Risk," FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994, at
21.
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informally to a third party. The shifting of such responsibility could only
be accomplished by a formal written agreement."
2. Scope of Use
This risk disclosure statement should be provided to non-dealer
institutions that are claiming the status of sophisticated investors. The
statements should be given to the institution by broker-dealers or other
vendors, including banks, that are offering or selling instruments to
accredited investors. The statements need not be given for instruments
traded or quoted on a commodity exchange registered as a contract market
with the CFTC, a national securities exchange, or NASDAQ.
The risk disclosure document should be required for private
placements and over-the-counter derivative instruments. A new risk
disclosure statement need not be given for each transaction. Rather, the
statement should only be required once, at the beginning of the financial
relationship, when the institution first begins to deal with the broker-
dealer, bank, or other vendor.
3. Effects
The most significant effect of the risk disclosure statement will be to
put institutional management on notice that it must analyze the institution's
investments. 147 The risk disclosure statement should prevent institutions
from claiming that they are sophisticated investors and then asserting lack
of sophistication when they lose money through investing.
The risk disclosure statement would not insulate a broker-dealer or
other purveyor of complex financial instruments from fraud claims. Where
there are specific misrepresentations, liability will still exist if causation
can be shown. For example, a derivatives dealer who misrepresents the
status .of a customer's account, as in the case of Bankers Trust, would still
146. To cut paperwork, it would seem administratively appropriate for subsequent
statements to be acknowledged by a corporate officer, provided that the board has
passed a formal resolution allowing that action by a particular officer.
147. The fiduciary duty of care that directors owe to their shareholders requires that
directors inform themselves of the activities of their corporation. The business judgment rule
protects directors from liability arising from bad decisions, but not from uninformed ones.
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr.,
The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles Wisely Expounded, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
923 (1990). The large losses suffered by institutions suggest that at least some of those firms
did not use proper care in informing themselves of the enormous risks presented by
derivative instruments. They also apparently failed to monitor those instruments once they
were placed on the institution's books.
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be liable for losses. This means that a risk disclosure document cannot be
used as a shield for fraud. Nevertheless, as suggested by Zobrist, oral
misrepresentations that contradict written statements may not be
actionable. 141
In a series of cases, the CFTC has also held that downplaying the
language of a risk disclosure statement negates its effects.149 Such a rule
may be appropriate for truly unsophisticated customers. It has less
applicability to a sophisticated institution. To the contrary, the institution
should be alerted that something is amiss if a broker-dealer supplies oral
information that downplays a government mandated warning or that
conflicts with a mandated written disclosure statement.
The requirement of a risk disclosure statement will, of course, result
in some additional expense and bureaucracy. That burden, however,
would be minimal. Institutions trading on an organized futures exchange
in the United States are already required to sign as many as twenty
documents before they are allowed to trade. 50 They are required to sign
far fewer documents in trading over-the-counter derivative instruments,
but the risks of those instruments may be no less great than the risks of
futures transactions.151
The benefits created by the risk disclosure document outweigh the
additional burden it imposes. Most significantly, the risk disclosure
statements would serve to put the institution's management on notice of
148. Cf. Wright v. National Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1992)
(sophisticated, accredited investor could be defrauded under the federal securities laws where
he did not have access to information that would have disclosed the fraud).
149. See, e.g., Reed v. Sage Group, Inc., [1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 23,943 (C.F.T.C. 1987); Nyahay v. National Monetary Fund, Inc., [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,121 (C.F.T.C. 1986); Camp v.
First National Monetary Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,190 (C.F.T.C. 1986); Weinberger v. First National Monetary Corp., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,845 (C.F.T.C. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d
1334 (6th Cir. 1987); accord, McNally v. Gildersleeve, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,006 (8th Cir. 1994). See generally Harman v. Murlas
Commodities, Inc., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,323,
(C.F.T.C. 1992); Heilman v. First National Monetary Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,307 (C.F.T.C. 1986); Jakobsen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,812
(C.F.T.C. 1985).
150. Feuding Away Their Futures, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 101.
151. There is no strong current interest in extensive regulation of over-the-counter
derivatives. Tim Carrington, Few Support Any New Rules on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar.
9, 1995, at CI. Nevertheless, the industry does recognize that there are problems to be
addressed. Six firms have voluntarily agreed to provide risk disclosure documents to their
customers. Jeffrey Taylor, Securities Firms Agree to Set Controls on Derivatives, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 9, 1995, at C1.
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the danger of these instruments and to remind them of their obligation to
assure that the institution's risk management procedures are sufficient to
protect the firm. 152 This notice should both cause the institutions to
reflect on their responsibilities before embarking on an investment
program they do not understand and preclude after-the-fact claims of lack
of sophistication. Greater institutional care will result in less litigation and
fewer unnecessary losses.
B. Private Risk Assignment Through Contracts
In those instances where the institution does not have the expertise
to analyze the risk or appropriateness of a particular instrument or group
of instruments, the institution could contract specifically for those
services. As a competitive matter, the broker-dealer, bank, or other
vendor may want to offer such services anyway. In the absence of a
written agreement, however, an institution signing the risk disclosure
statement would be on its own with' respect to legal responsibility for its
investment decision.
Increasingly, institutions are finding that their resources are not
always sufficient to allow them to analyze and monitor some of the more
complex derivative instruments that are being developed on Wall Street.
These institutions may need to obtain supplementary expertise to buttress
their own analysis. This may be accomplished through the hiring of
additional personnel or by contracting with a third party. Institutions are
also increasingly turning to their banks and brokers for advice and
guidance. 1'
Such arrangements are a responsible way of dealing with risk and
should be encouraged. Hiring third parties, however, has its own dangers.
The third party may enjoy such latitude that the institution unwittingly
assumes excessively risky positions.'54 When things go wrong, the
152. An Australian court has already held that a corporation's board of directors has
an obligation to establish systems to monitor the company's trading activities. AWA, Ltd
v. Daniels, 10 ACLC 929 (N.S.W. 1992). Nevertheless, many companies have not
established adequate controls. Conner Middelmann, Derivatives Control 'Missing,' FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at 6.
153. Risk Management, Contracting Out, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at 96.
154. To cite a few examples, a trader at Barings PLC forced an old and honored
institution into receivership in February 1995. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
The Kidder Peabody brokerage firm was devastated by the unauthorized trading of one of
its employees in 1994, losing over $350 million from that trading. See Dismembered,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1994, at 90; Floyd Norris, At Kidder, Peabody: Where Trading Went
Awry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at D6; Michael Siconolfi, Kidder Discloses Phoney
Trades, Fires a Trader, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A3. Earlier, Merrill Lynch lost
some $377 million from the trading of an employee that had been concealed from
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institution may want to blame the dealers or brokers who sold the
instruments without revealing the extent of the risk posed by employee
actions.
This raises important questions concerning risk management and the
legal responsibilities of investment advisers. It also raises the issue of how
to allocate liability when the institution is parcelling out its risk
management responsibilities. At what point does a broker-dealer or bank
assume the role of an adviser and become a fiduciary rather than a
vendor? What is the scope of an adviser's fiduciary duties?'56 Two cases
lend some guidance.
First, in Holmes v. Wheat First Securities, Inc. ,"57 the CFTC stated
that a broker may have a fiduciary obligation to disclose information
beyond that in a risk disclosure statement. The amount of disclosure
required depends on the nature of the relationship between the customer
and the broker. If the broker acts merely as an agent for execution of the
customer's order, providing the risk disclosure document normally fulfills
the broker's risk disclosure duty. Where the account is controlled by the
broker, however, fiduciary obligations may expand, requiring additional
disclosures. This approach would be equally useful for institutional risk
disclosures.
The second relevant case is Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. 15 8 There, the court held that a securities broker did not
owe fiduciary duties to a customer unless there was an express advisory
contract or the customer was "infirm or ignorant of business affairs."
15 9
This would be a good rule for institutions. There is no expectation on the
part of a broker-dealer that it is acting as a fiduciary for an institution in
the absence of a formal agreement or statutory duty. To the contrary, a
broker-dealer can expect that the institution will closely analyze the
broker-dealer's investment advice. Further, institutions typically require
from broker-dealers a reduction in commission fees and markups. Part of
the justification for such a reduction is that, in addition to providing high
volume, an institution does not require the same care and handling as do
management. Michael Siconolfi, Talented Outcasts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1993, at Al.
155. See supra part II.A.2.
156. The liability concern here is not merely theoretical. A Federal Reserve Report
found that seven banks had paid some $130 million to compensate mutual funds for losses
from derivative instruments that were purchased upon the advice of the banks. Keith
Bradsher, Treasury to Take Closer Look at Banks with Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1994, at D2.
157. [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,823 (C.F.T.C.
1990).
158. 337 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972).
159. Id. at 113.
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retail customers. If the institutions do demand that they be given the
additional services supplied to unsophisticated retail customers, that
demand should be made explicit and reduced to writing. Such a demand
is a variance from the "normal" relationship between a broker-dealer and
an institutional customer, and that variance should be memorialized.
Conclusion
The growth and complexity of new financial instruments have led to
concerns that even the most sophisticated institutions cannot appreciate
all of the risks that they may encounter in their investment programs. The
large losses that have been experienced by institutions investing in over-
the-counter derivative instruments lend credence to those concerns. Efforts
to shift responsibility for these investments to the institutions' vendors,
however, seem to reverse the regulatory approach that has been developed
to accommodate the growth of institutional trading in recent years. By this
approach, institutions are considered sophisticated traders which do not
need the paternalistic protection accorded to unsophisticated retail
customers.
Rather than abandoning that system, it may be best to take a more
formal approach to risk allocation. An institution that wants the advantages
of being treated as an accredited or exempt investor under the federal
securities laws or the Commodity Exchange Act should be required to
acknowledge that it is a sophisticated investor. The institution should also
be required to acknowledge that, as a sophisticated trader, it is responsible
for conducting its own suitability analysis. If the institution is unable or
unwilling to make that acknowledgement, then it should be treated as any
other retail investor, and it should also lose its accredited or exempt
investor status.
In those instances in which an acknowledging institution believes that
a particular program or instrument is beyond its expertise, it may contract
for advice from a third party. That contract should be in writing, and it
should specify the role of the adviser. The contract would impose
enforceable obligations on the adviser and could even give rise to
fiduciary duties that would increase on a sliding scale as the role of the
adviser approached complete discretionary control over the institution's
account.
In the absence of this approach, we are left with a rather anomalous
situation in which large institutions demand freedom from burdensome
regulations intended for the unsophisticated, while at the same time
claiming the protection of those very same regulations when fate turns
sour. Institutions seeking this freedom should be required to delineate in
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advance those situations in which they are to be treated as sophisticated
investors and those in which they are to receive the protection and bear
the burdens of the ordinary investor.
